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Abstract
We evaluate the diﬀerential eﬀects of Tied and Untied aid on growth,
and how these eﬀects vary with the policy environment of the recipient
country. To do so, we use Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine
and Roodman (2003) datasets. We ﬁnd that aid eﬀectiveness is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent for the two types of aid. However, when we condition on
policies, we ﬁnd that untied aid has a greater impact on growth than tied
aid. We ﬁnd that this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for the sample of low and
middle-income countries, and is not statistically signiﬁcant, but consistent
in sign for the sub sample of low-income countries.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
"In general, donors have not discriminated eﬀectively among diﬀerent countries
and diﬀerent phases of the reform process. Donors tend to provide the same
package of assistance everywhere at all times"1. Historically, multilateral and
bilateral aid donors propose fairly standardized aid contracts, with conditional-
ity2 a common clause to the majority of the agreements. The clause that has
introduced some heterogeneity to the aid contracts as implemented is tied versus
untied aid: whether the recipient is free to decide the use of the funds received
or must use the funds to buy goods and services from the donor country.
Traditionally, aid eﬀectiveness literature considers aid as an aggregate. In
their inﬂuential paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) claim that aid has a positive
impact on growth in countries with good policies. This result, quite contro-
versial and starting point of much debate, leaves policy makers with an open
question: What can be done in countries with bad policies? How should aid
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1Aid and Reform in Africa, World Bank 2001
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Svenson (2003), Drehen (2002) evaluate the eﬀect of conditionality on Aid eﬀectiveness.
1contracts oﬀerings adapt to individual country characteristics to maximize their
eﬀectiveness?
Since creation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an impor-
tant issue arises as to whether aid recipients should be freely available to buy
goods and services from all countries ("untied aid"), or should aid recipient
countries be restricted to the procurement of goods and services from the donor
country ("tied aid"). The DAC recommends untying Oﬃcial Development As-
sistance to Least Developed Countries: it expects untied aid to be more eﬃcient
than tied aid due to administrative burdens and possible technical incompatibili-
ties among donor and recipient technologies that accompany tied aid. Moreover,
tied aid, sometimes qualiﬁed as a hidden subsidy to donor’s national industries,
arguably responds to political pressures, as opposed to recipient countries needs.
Accordingly, DAC recommendations and the aid eﬀectiveness literature beg
the following question: Which contract is more eﬀective for each set of recipient
characteristics? To examine how diﬀerent recipient characteristics aﬀect each
contract’s eﬀectiveness can help to design the optimal contract for each recipient
situation and improve the overall eﬀectiveness of development assistance. Con-
cretely, the question we pose is: Do both tied and untied aids have diﬀerential
eﬀe c t so ng r o w t h ?A n dh o wd os u c hd i ﬀerential eﬀects depend on the existence
of good policy environments?
The literature on aid eﬀectiveness is extensive, yet shows contradictory re-
sults. A well-known example is the sequence that Burnside and Dollar (2000)
begin and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004)3 continue, which ﬁnds oppo-
site results as to whether aid and recipient growth are conditional on country
policies, and the latter highlights the robustness problems of the former.
Apart from the robustness of the results to new data, several econometric
concerns appear in cross-country aid eﬀectiveness regressions. As examples,
Hansen and Tarp (2001) show how eﬀectiveness results are highly sensitive to
the choice of the estimator and the set of control variables, while Clemens,
Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) show how assistance can be separated into short-
and long-term aid to use the appropriate measure to calculate aid eﬀectiveness
for each period of time. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) present a robust check
of existing literature on the channels of aid eﬀectiveness.
More on our line of estimating the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of aid, Easterly
(2003) emphasizes the need to properly deﬁne a measure of assistance, and
Minoiu and Reddy (2007) argue that aid should not be treated as a homogenous
variable, but rather should be separated into geopolitical aid and developmental
aid categories. Bobba and Powel (2007) study the ﬀect of the procedence of aid
( from political allies or non-allies) on growth.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the data, Section
3 examines the determinants of tied and untied aid, Section 4 studies the eﬀect
of the two aid contracts considered on growth, and Section 5 concludes.
3Followed by Burnside and Dollar (2004) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) with
reply and comments.
22 Data sources and econometric strategy
We extend the Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) dataset with information
on tied and untied Aid from the DAC_OECD database. This data, available at
www.cgdev.org, includes a panel of 70 aid recipient countries for the 1970-1997
period. We extend the Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) dataset using
tied and untied aid data from OECD (Development Assistance Committee and
Creditor Reporting System) for the given time period4.W ef o l l o wt h ed a t a s e t
structure using four-year averages to construct the panel. The ﬁnal dataset used
includes multilateral and bilateral donors, but does not include humanitarian
or emergency aid.
The dataset used is chosen for comparability, as it has been used, in many
of its extended versions, in the most inﬂuential extant aid eﬀectiveness studies.
First created by Burnside and Dollar (2000) to ﬁnd that aid works in a good
policy environment, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) extend the data set
one more period and ﬁll in some missing data. They ﬁnd that Burnside and
Dollar (2000) results are not robust and require the use of additional data.
Burnside and Dollar (2004) reply to these critiques with the argument that
resultant study’s diﬀering results are driven by the new data. The introduction
of tied and untied aid data to the same dataset used by Burnside and Dollar
(2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) allows us to compare our
results against previous studies and to check the robustness of our claim to the
diﬀerent samples.
Aid-growth cross-country regressions endogeneity problems are discussed ex-
tensively in the aid literature. Instrumental variables estimations, which treat
all regressors that involve aid as endogenous, are a common approach to the
problem. Burnside and Dollar (2000) introduce a set of instruments containing
regional dummies, policy variables, and measures of socioeconomic stability that
is followed consistently in extant literature. Hansen and Tarp (2001) extend this
set of instruments to include all aid regressors lagged one period as instruments,
what required GMM to estimate aid eﬀect on growth.
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), we create a policy index that weights
policies according to their impact on growth. To construct the index, we use
policy variables that include the Trade Openness Index of Sachs and Warner,
inﬂation as a measure of monetary policy, and we use budget surplus relative
to GDP as a ﬁscal variable
O u ro b j e c t i v ei st os t u d yt h ee ﬀect of two proposed aid contracts: tied and
untied aid, on growth. For comparability with the literature, we follow the
robustness of our results to diﬀerent estimation procedures (OLS, 2SLS and the
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998)).
In the instrumental variables approach, we begin with the determinants of
each type of aid (ﬁrst stage regression) and then use these instrumented variables
to obtain the eﬀect of each aid contract on growth. In the second stage, we
check the eﬀectiveness of tied and untied aid, individually, and then check for
4An average of 20% of aid is tied, and the percentage increases in the 80’s.
3consistency of the results to diﬀerent estimation procedures. Given the need to
instrument both tied and untied aid variables, we dedicate the following section
to an examination of the correct instruments for each.
Further, we proceed with the traditional 2SLS framework to check the dif-
ferential eﬀe c to ft i e da n du n t i e da i do ng r o w t h ,a n dh o wp o l i c i e sa ﬀect this
diﬀerential eﬀect. Accordingly, we extend Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) esti-
mating equation to
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where git is per capita real GDP growth, yit logarithm of initial real per capita
GDP, aT
it and aU
it are the vectors of aid receipts relative to GDP for each type of
aid, Pit is a vector of macro policy variables, and Zitis a set of exogenous vari-
ables. The ﬁrst stage necessary to instrument aid (and all regressors involving
aid) is given by
aT




it is the vector of errors of the ﬁrst stage regression. The coeﬃcients on
untied aid and untied aid interacted with policies give us the diﬀerential eﬀect
of each aid contract on growth.
3T i e d a n d U n t i e d A i d
Tied aid is that which is given on the condition that the beneﬁciary uses it to
purchase goods and services from suppliers based in the donor country. "Untie
aid" therefore means to open up aid recipient purchases to suppliers in other
countries in addition to the donor country5. The DAC has recommended unty-
ing Oﬃcial Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries. Untied
a i di se x p e c t e dt ob em o r ee ﬃcient than tied aid due to administrative burdens
and possible technical incompatibilities tied aid may create between donor and
5General Development Framework, European Union (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12108.htm)
4recipient country technologies. In addition, untied aid is presumably subject to
fewer political pressures than tied aid creates.
Table 1 presents the ﬁrst stage results for each type of aid, accounting for
country-speciﬁc, ﬁxed eﬀects for the set of low-income countries. Following
the literature, yet with further extended choice, the included instruments are:
regional dummies (sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc Zone, Egypt, and central Eu-
ropean countries), and socioeconomic variables (a measure of arms imports rel-
ative to total imports lagged one period, and policy variables, such as ethnic
factorization and rate of political assassinations and their interactions).
We ﬁnd that each set of variables has diﬀerent eﬀects for each type of aid.
Arms imports and their interaction with policy are signiﬁcant determinants of
untied aid, together with social stability variables. For tied aid, signiﬁcant
determinants are population and initial GDP of the recipient. Poorer and more
populated countries are more likely to receive greater amounts of tied aid, while
more socially stable countries are more likely to receive greater amounts of
untied aid. When we examine aggregate aid, we ﬁnd that aid decreases with
the social stability of the recipient, a pattern that follows the untied aid pattern.
As intuition tells us, each type of aid requires a diﬀerent set of instruments:
while tied aid is closely related to initial income and population, untied aid
is sensitive to the socioeconomic situation. The choice of instruments for each
type of aid diﬀers from the common aggregate aid instrumentation debate: each
speciﬁc type of aid is more closely related to recipient characteristics than the
aggregate measure. This fact leaves some instruments of aggregate aid, for
example colonial links, with reduced instrumentation power on the speciﬁca i d
contract.
4A i d e ﬀect on growth
To determine aid’s eﬀect on the recipient country’s growth through each of the
aid contracts considered- both tied and untied- we check the eﬀectiveness of
each type of contract to oﬀer a comparison.
I nT a b l e2 ,w es t u d yt h ee ﬀect of tied aid on growth for the entire sample of
countries. We ﬁnd that, for all estimation procedures, tied aid has a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on growth, and that this eﬀect is independent of the policies of
the recipient country. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant "increasing returns" on the quadratic
term: as the amount of tied aid increases, its negative eﬀect on growth decreases.
No signiﬁcant eﬀect of untied aid on growth is found for the same sample of
countries, given the same speciﬁcations.
Looking only at this result, we are tempted to conclude that untied aid is the
optimal strategy to ensure growth in recipient countries. Table 3 presents the
symmetric estimations for aggregated aid and untied aid. Last column shows
that untied aid has signiﬁcantly greater eﬀect on growth than tied aid, but that
the eﬀect of interaction with policies is not statistically diﬀerent.
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the random eﬀects estimation of the aid eﬀect on
growth for the four sample speciﬁcations of Burnside and Dollar (2000). We ﬁnd
5t h a tt h er e s u l tt h a tt i e da i dh a sag r e a t e ri m p a c to ng r o w t ht h a nu n t i e da i di sn o t
suﬃciently robust to the sample speciﬁcation. For the low- and middle-income
sample speciﬁcation (including or excluding outliers), we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence
of coeﬃcients is also related to policies: untied aid works better than tied aid,
and the diﬀerence between the two increases as good policies of the recipient
country increases. Even if this result is not robust to the sample speciﬁcation,
its sign is intuitive: for countries with bad policies, diﬀerential eﬀects of the
two aid contracts is considered minimal, and when policies are better, recipient
country governments are able to take greater advantage of untied aid over tied
aid.
To focus only on one speciﬁcation leads to strong results. For example, if we
look only at Table 5, we could conclude that a transfer of 1% from tied to untied
aid in a good policy environment could aﬀect growth by 4.5 points and this result
is statistically signiﬁcant. However, looking at the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, this
percentage changes from 6.2 in Table 4 to 1.6 in Table 7, but these coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcant. We can conclude that with better policies, untied aid has
greater eﬀect on growth, but this result is not statistically signiﬁcant for the
diﬀerent sample speciﬁcations.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we show that an intuitive claim that untied aid is more eﬀective
than tied aid is not suﬃciently supported by the data. We ﬁnd that, even if,
for some samples of countries, untied aid has greater impact on growth than
tied aid, the result is not robust. Upon data analysis, we further ﬁnd that
the diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness of each contract is related to the policies of the
recipient countries: the more favorable the policy environment of the recipient
country, the greater the diﬀerential eﬀect of untied aid over tied aid, on growth.
Tied aid is the subject of heated political debate and should be considered
carefully. However, the results of this study suggest that tied aid may be more
growth-eﬀective than untied aid, under some circumstances. These results have
important policy implications: it is not that countries with bad policies should
not receive aid, since it is less eﬀective there. Rather, poorer and less stable
countries, and countries with bad policies, can make aid work in a way that
eﬀects growth, when it is oﬀered with the appropriate contract. While tied aid
receives signiﬁcant political critiques, which should be considered, the results of
this paper show that, in some situations, tied aid may be more eﬀective than
untied aid.
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7Table 1 : Aid Regressions with country speciﬁc( ﬁxed) eﬀects
Dependent Variable: Tied Aid Untied Aid All Aid
Arms imports over total imports 0.396 4.153 4.549
(0.81) (2.52)∗ (2.76)∗
Log population 0.144 0.229 0.374
(0.05)∗∗ (0.17) (0.19)∗
Arms * policy -0.140 -3.43 -3.574
(0.65) (2.03)∗ (2.22)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.219 -1.682 -1.902
(0.22) (0.69)∗∗ (0.76)∗∗
Assasinations 0.118 -0.825 -0.706
(0.10) (0.33)∗∗ (0.36)∗
Ethnic * assasinations -0.838 3.692 2.853
(0.38)∗∗ (1.18)∗∗ (1.29)∗∗
Log initial GDP per capita -0.624 -0.292 -0.916
(0.23)∗∗ (0.73) (0.80)
Sample: Low income countries, outliers excluded
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Regional dummies, Population and policy interactions, and institutional quality included as regressors.Table 2 : Growth Regressions with country speciﬁc( ﬁxed) eﬀects
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS1 GMM2
Tied Aid -2.892 -6.885 -3.003
(1.14)∗∗ (3.44)∗∗ (0.95)∗∗
Tied Aid2 0.612 2.505 0.553
(0.27)∗∗ (.1.37)∗ (0.26)∗∗
Tied Aid*Policy 0.445 0.151 0.090
(0.32) (0.34) (0.22)
ln(initial GDP per capita) -0.177 -0.473 -0.284
(0.43) (0.45) (0.44)
Ethnic Fractorization -0.033 -1.867 -1.30
(0.65)∗∗ (1.07)∗ (1.10)
Assasinations 0.073 0.202 -0.545
(0.32) (0.39) (0.34)
Ethnic * Assasinations -0.033 -0.255 0.545
(0.65) (0.75) (0.78)
Institutional Quality 0.269 0.085 0.158
(0.13)∗∗ (0.16) (0.16)
Policy 19.665 0.932 0.855
(13.53) (0.24)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗
R squared 0.4237 0.2264
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: All countries (160)
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Time, Sub-saharian Africa and Asia dummies were included in all regressions.
1 Instruments: Log population, Arms impots lagged one period, population-policy interactions, initial GDP-
population interaction.
2 Blundell Bond (2000) Estimator, Sargan test of overidentiﬁed restrictions p-value 0.306Table 3 : Growth Regressions with country speciﬁc( ﬁxed) eﬀects
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS1 GMM2 GMM2
Aid -0.451 -1.797 -0.405 -1.153
(0.32) (0.95)∗∗ (0.27) (0.65)
Aid2 0.038 0.270 0.056
(0.03) (0.15) (0.03)∗
Aid*Policy 0.073 -0.041 0.062 0.028
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.26)
Untied Aid -0.383 -1.541 -0.128 1.289
(0.34) (0.96)∗ (0.30) (0.85)∗
Untied Aid2 0.057 0.267 0519
(0.03) (0.19) (0.03)
Untied Aid*Policy -0.023 -0.100 0.039 0.085
(0.15) (0.23) (0.12) (0.34)
Sargan test of
overidentiﬁed
restrictions 0.26 0.306 0.442
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: All countries (160)
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Ethnic fractorization, assasinations, institutional quality, policy, together with time, Sub-saharian Africa and Asia
dummies included in all regressions.
1 Instruments: Log population, Arms impots lagged one period, population-policy interactions, initial GDP-
population interaction.
2 Blundell Bond (2000) Estimator.Table 4 : Growth regressions with country speciﬁc( r a n d o m )e ﬀects
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Aid 1.001 -1.447
(0.59)∗ (1.57)






Tied Aid*Policies 3.031 -3.341 -6.284
(1.13)∗∗ (2.39) (5.25)
Untied Aid*Policies 0.687 1.131
(0.23)∗∗ (0.54)∗∗
R squared 0.3694 0.3736 0.3316 0.2964 0.2377
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: Low and Middle Income countries, Outliers excluded, 268 observations
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Regressors: Ethnic fractiorization, assasinations, regional dummies, institutional quality measure, M2/GDP, initial
GDP per capita, and interactions.Table 5 : Growth regressions with country speciﬁc( r a n d o m )e ﬀects
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Aid -0.082 -0.631
(0.35) (1.02)






Tied Aid*Policies 0.186 -1.342 -4.511
(0.29) (0.85)∗ (2.07)∗∗
Untied Aid*Policies 0.165 0.673
(0.13) (0.39)∗
R squared 0.3642 0.3652 0.3629 0.3627 0.2385
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: Low and Middle Income countries, 274 observations
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Regressors: Ethnic fractiorization, assasinations, regional dummies, institutional quality measure, M2/GDP, initial
GDP per capita, and interactions.Table 6 : Growth regressions with country speciﬁc( r a n d o m )e ﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid -1.001 -0.681
(0.57)∗ (1.04)






Tied Aid*Policies 4.588 -3.593 -2.306
(2.77)∗ (3.57) (7.01)
Untied Aid*Policies 0.622 0.864
(0.27)∗∗ (0.65)
R squared 0.4593 0.4622 0.3475 0.3408 0.4043
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: Low income countries, Outliers excluded, 178 observations
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Regressors: Ethnic fractiorization, assasinations, regional dummies, institutional quality measure, M2/GDP, initial
GDP per capita, and interactions.Table 7 : Growth regressions with country speciﬁc( r a n d o m )e ﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid 0.038 -0.640
(0.29) (0.68)






Tied Aid*Policies -0.104 -0.447 -1.621
(0.29) (0.76) (2.07)
Untied Aid*Policies 0.004 0.169
(0.15) (0.37)
R squared 0.4747 0.4724 0.477 0.4824 0.4651
Dependent Variable: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Sample: Low income countries, 183 observations
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, **5%
Std. errors in parentesis.
Regressors: Ethnic fractiorization, assasinations, regional dummies, institutional quality measure, M2/GDP, initial
GDP per capita, and interactions.